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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Wendy Beighley appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing
her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she asserts that the district court erred
when it summarily dismissed her claim that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel when her attorney failed to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's
breach of the plea agreement.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Wendy Beighley was convicted, by guilty plea, of one count of lewd conduct, and
received a unified sentence of twenty years, with seven years fixed. On direct appeal,
she unsuccessfully challenged the length of her sentence.

(R., p.2.)

Following her

appeal, Ms. Beighley filed a timely, verified petition for post-conviction relief in which
she raised a number of claims, only one of which is relevant on appeal:

that she

received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney "refus[ed] to withdraw [her]
guilty plea." (R., pp.1-2.) In elaborating on this claim, she explained that "counsel failed
to withdraw guilty plea" despite "a clear breach in of [sic] the plea agreement." (R., p.3.)
The district court appointed counsel with respect to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim at issue on appeal, while providing notice of its intent to dismiss her other
claims. 1 (R., pp.13-14.) Post-conviction counsel then filed a response to the district
court's notice of intent to dismiss in which he gratuitously asserted, inter alia, that he

Those claims concerned her sentence and were properly dismissed as they were
addressed in her direct appeal.
1

1

had contacted trial counsel who "told the undersigned that he never received a request
from petitioner to withdraw her plea, either prior to sentencing or after sentencing. He
indicated he did not receive a request from her either in writing, in person, or over the
phone."

(R., p.23.)

Ms. Beighley then filed a handwritten affidavit in which she

elaborated on her claim, writing,
I agreed to a guilty plea, for one count with the second to be dropped.
was also told by my attorney Faren Eddins that the prosecuting attorney
Chris Lundberg was okay with a sentencing of probation and outpatient
treatment. My PSI recommended a "period of incarceration," during
sentencing Mr. Lundberg stated that the Judge follow the recommendation
of the PSI for sentencing. Spencer Hahn my appellate Public Defender
was the one who found the discrepancy and suggested that [I] ask for a
plea withdrawal and to do this before my appeal was decided. I then tried
to contact Mr. Eddins by phone several times and was unable to get
through to him. I also asked my parents to try and contact Mr. Eddins and
they were also unsuccessful in contacting him, before the deadline. Since
the time he was appointed to me I had difficulty contacting Mr. Eddins, this
is a violation of Code of Professional Conduct IRPC 1.4.
(R., pp.28-29.)
The PSI writer's recommendation was as follows:
I do recognize the benefits of "community-based placement and outpatient
treatment," including continued counseling sessions as well as sex
offender specific treatment. However, I suggest additional sanctions are
also warranted in Ms. Beighley's case. The defendant chose to victimize
both of her children, at the request of a stranger. It is impossible to gauge
the long-term effects of that abuse on [her children], but I believe
Ms. Beighley should be held accountable for her actions and the potential
impact to her children. Therefore, I respectfully recommend the Court
consider a period of incarceration in the defendant's case.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12.)
The State filed a Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Motion for
Summary Judgment. The State described what it believed to be the likely claim raised
by Ms. Beighley as being "that there was a breach of the plea agreement in this matter,"
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which it described as "inaccurate, unsupported by the record, unsupported by any
admissible evidence known to the State, and if resolved in the Petitioner's favor would
not entitle the Petitioner to the requested relief." (R., p.39.)
The State described one term of the plea agreement, a copy of which was
attached to its response, 2 as being a promise that "[t]he State does not object to
withheld judgment," and went on to note that there were:
two (2) uncontestable facts in the record of these proceedings that
demonstrate that this term of the plea agreement was not violated. The
first of those is that the State never objected to the request for a withheld
judgment . . . The second uncontestable fact in the record of these
proceedings is that, while the State was barred from objecting to a
withheld judgment, the State was not obligated to recommend a withheld
judgment.
(R., pp.40-41.) The State concluded this portion of its motion by noting that because
"the State made no sentencing recommendation and never objected to entry of a
withheld judgment, there is simply no basis for the Petitioner to allege that there was a
violation of the third term of the plea agreement." (R., p.42.)
The State also explained that,
the relief requested in this matter in her original Petition ... a reduction in
sentence to a unified term of five (5) years ... and a subsequent release
onto probation, is a remedy inconsistent with the Petitioner's allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or breach of a plea agreement . . .
[because] Petitioner's length of sentence has been determined on
appea I .... "
(R., p.43.) The State then explained,
If the District Court were to somehow find merit in the Petitioner's
allegations, the appropriate remedy in that case would be to withdraw the

2

The copy of the Plea Agreement attached to the State's response was omitted from
the post-conviction appellate record. A copy is contained in the appellate record from
Ms. Beighley's direct appeal (37799 R., pp.23-25), which has been judicially-noticed by
this Court.
3

plea agreement and set the matter for trial on the original Criminal
Information containing both Count I and Count II. The State would also be
entitled to pursue additional criminal charges related to the facts of the
case and would be allowed to object to a withheld judgment at sentencing.
(R., p.43 n.1.)
At a hearing on the State's motion for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed the claim regarding her attorney's failure to seek to withdraw her guilty plea,
finding, "[i]t was a legal sentence" and that "[s]he has not indicated any grounds which
would justify the withdrawal of that plea or any manifest injustice or any other facts upon
which the Court might be inclined to withdraw the plea," and concluded that "there is no
genuine issue of material fact at issue." (Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.2.) The district court
then issued a Judgment dismissing the petition. (R., p.54.)
Ms. Beighley filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.56.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Beighley's claim that her
attorney was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's
breach of the plea agreement?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Beighley's Claim That Her
Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Upon The
State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it summarily dismissed Ms. Beighley's claim that

her attorney was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the
State's breach of the plea agreement because there was a genuine issue of fact as to
the claim.

B.

Standards Of Review

1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
counsel.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).

Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains
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simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point for evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998).

In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced.

"The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),

If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different,"
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).

2.

Summary Dismissal

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
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with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant.

I.C. § 19-4903.

The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings.

I.C. § 19-4906(b).

In considering summary dismissal in a case

where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences.

See State v. Yakovac,

145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to
petition).

However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the

petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue
of fact exists.

I.C. § 19-4906.

When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if

resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145
Idaho 148, 153 (2008).

At the summary dismissal stage, the petitioner need only

present prima facie evidence of both prongs of Strickland. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567, 571 (2010).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
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dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v.

State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Beighley's Claim That
Her Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
Upon The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement
The evidence before the district court at the time that it summarily dismissed

Ms. Beighley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim clearly established a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether her attorney was ineffective for failing to move to
withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's breach of the plea agreement.
Ms. Beighley established that she had entered into a plea agreement with the
State, one of the terms of which was that the State would not object to a withheld
judgment.
judgment").)

(R., pp.1-3; 37799 R., p.24 ("The State does not object to withheld
At sentencing, defense counsel asked that the district court grant

Ms. Beighley a withheld judgment. (37799 Sent.Tr., p.29, Ls.4-7.) While the State did
not expressly object to a withheld judgment and advocate imposition of a prison
sentence, it did so tacitly when it said,
Finally, you know, I, I guess I would just refer to the - to all the
recommendations in the presentence investigation [report], including the
recommendation for what to do, to do in this case; and just ask the Court
to be sure to review all, all of the information contained in this, in this
packet, weigh it appropriately, and, and certainly weigh all those
recommendations for, for appropriate sentencing in this matter.
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(37799 Sent.Tr., p.33, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).)
The PSl's recommendation was as follows:
I do recognize the benefits of "community-based placement and outpatient
treatment," including continued counseling sessions as well as sex
offender specific treatment. However, I suggest additional sanctions are
also warranted in Ms. Beighley's case. The defendant chose to victimize
both of her children, at the request of a stranger. It is impossible to gauge
the long-term effects of that abuse on [her children], but I believe
Ms. Beighley should be held accountable for her actions and the potential
impact to her children. Therefore, / respectfully recommend the Court
consider a period of incarceration in the defendant's case.
(PSI, pp.11-12.)
This tacit objection to a withheld judgment constituted a breach because, while a
judgment remains withheld, a prison sentence cannot be executed.

I.C. § 19-2601.

Despite this clear breach of the plea agreement, defense counsel did not object, did not
advise Ms. Beighley of her ability to move to withdraw her guilty plea, and did not file a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp.1-3, 28-29.) Ms. Beighley was prejudiced
because, upon the issuance of the remittitur in her direct appeal, the district court lost
jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. See State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 610, 614 (Ct. App. 2010).
When a defendant enters a guilty plea in reliance upon a promise
by the prosecution, a breach of that promise will invalidate the plea.
Because a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, "a defendant is
constitutionally entitled to relief when the state breaches a promise made
to him in return for a plea of guilty."
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 595 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). "[A]n essential
duty" of defense counsel is to object upon a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement.
Failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
N.W.2d 294, 301 (Iowa 1999).
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State v. Harness, 600

A prosecutor may not pay mere "lip service" to his or her obligations under a plea
agreement.

See State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300 (Ct. App. 2004) ("If the

prosecution has breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach
was intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing
and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise.

In

such an event, the defendant will be entitled to relief.") (citations omitted).
In Daubs, the prosecutor originally assigned to the case reached a plea
agreement with Daubs under the terms of which the State would "recommend that
Daubs receive no more than a rider." At the sentencing hearing, a new prosecutor
acknowledged the State's promise to ask for no more than a rider before it "directed the
court's attention to the presentence investigation (PSI) report, which recommended
prison . . . . "

Id.

The Court of Appeals described the prosecutor's statements as

"fundamentally at odds with the terms of the plea agreement" because it included
"highlight[ing] the contrary recommendation of the PSI investigator" for a prison
sentence, and concluded that it "amount[ed] to an abrogation of the plea agreement,
and a tacit adoption of a recommendation altogether different from the one for which the
state and defendant had bargained," and breached the plea agreement. Id.
In this case, Ms. Beighley established that the State breached the term of the
plea agreement that it would not object to a withheld judgment when it, like the
prosecutor in Daubs, tacitly adopted the PSl's recommendation that a prison sentence
be executed.

Ms. Beighley also established that her attorney failed to object to the

breach and failed to counsel her that she could move to withdraw her plea, let alone file
a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Ms. Beighley's claim of ineffective assistance of
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counsel presented a genuine issue of material fact for which she was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, and the district court erred when it summarily dismissed it.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Beighley respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the judgment of dismissal as to her claim, and remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 24 th day of June, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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